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Integrating the Eastern Lander:
How Long a Transition?
CONTENTS
by Horst Siebert
In the 1990s, the economic policy situation in Germany will be determined by how quickly
eastern Germany catches up. This will determine the extent of transfers and, consequent-
ly, Germany's fiscal policy stance, which, in turn, will influence the macroeconomic policy
mix and the growth potential in western Germany.
Adjustment in eastern Germany is making progress. Privatization of the enterprise sector
has nearly been completed. In the privatized firms, a restructuring process is under way,
thus laying the foundations for future competitiveness. The producing sector has come
close to the production level of the second half of 1990. In the nontradables sector, the
adjustment process is proceeding smoothly. In the tradables sector, i.e., in industry, things
do not look so bright. An export basis has not yet been established.
Self-sustaining growth with sufficient momentum and independent of public transfers has
not yet taken place. However, investment is developing positively. The investment ratio is
more than 50 percent of GDP. More than 80 percent of investment has taken place in the
enterprise sector (including telecommunications, railroads, and housing); government in-
vestment is not playing the major role.
GDP per capita in eastern Germany rose from 28.8 percent of the western German level
in 1991 to 40.7 percent in 1993. How quickly the adjustment process will come about will
depend on investment, because capital accumulation must be the engine of the catching-
up process. A simple formula tells us which growth differentials and how much time will be
needed if eastern Germany is to reach the level of certain regions in western Germany. As-
suming annual eastern German growth is 5 percent higher than western German growth,
it will take eastern Germany until the year 2007 to reach an 80 percent adjustment target.
Assuming a growth differential of 10 percent, this will take until the year 2000.
Reunification has changed the characteristics of Germany as a whole. With an increase in
the share of government in GDP from 45 to 52 percent Germany has become a little less
of a market economy and a little more of a state economy. The economic system has
become less efficient, and this dampens the potential growth rate of western Germany. In
this situation, it is of paramount importance to reduce the budget deficit. This task will be
easier if eastern Germany proceeds to catch up quickly, because, then, Germany will sim-
ply "grow" out of its fiscal policy dilemma.
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In the medium and in the long run, the core of the German economic policy situation is defined by
how quickly eastern Germany will catch up. This will determine the extent of transfers needed and,
consequently, Germany's fiscal policy stance, which, in turn, will influence the growth potential in
western Germany via taxation and which is a cornerstone of the macroeconomic policy mix between
fiscal, monetary, and wage policy. Therefore, one of the central questions of German economic policy
in the 1990s will be how the transition process is proceeding in eastern Germany.
I. Progress in Adjustment
Privatization of the previously state-owned firms has nearly been completed, with only 237 firms out
of 13,500 still to be privatized (March 1994). Less than 100,000 employees of originally 4 million in
the Treuhand firms are involved (Table 1). Sectors in which privatization is still a major task include
the chemical industry, iron and steel, the mechanical engineering industry, and vehicle construction
(railroad cars, road vehicles). In the mechanical engineering industry, the Treuhand Agency will use
the concept of the "management firm," which serves as a holding and privatization company for some
ten firms still to be privatized. In the mining industry, privatization has just been concluded. The
Treuhand Agency has privatized basically the whole enterprise sector of the eastern German economy
within three years. It is reasonable to assume that in the privatized firms the restructuring process now
under way has laid the foundations for future competitiveness.
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aFirms for sale, i.e., total holdings minus firms that are to be liquidated minus firms for which privatization is under
way.
Source: Personal communication, the Treuhandanstalt, March 1994.Figure 1 — Gross Domestic Product
a in Eastern Germany, 1990-1993
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Source: DIW [1993].In the last quarter of 1993, the producing sector, which comprises energy, mining, manufacturing,
and construction, actually came close to the production level of the second half of 1990; it surpassed it
slightiy in October (Figure la, for more details see Table 2). Especially in the production of local and
regional goods, that is, in the nontradables sector, the adjustment process is proceeding smoothly.
This holds for construction and for the construction-related industries, for the crafts, and for the
service sector. The contribution of these sectors to GDP is rising (Figure lb). In construction and con-
struction-related industries such as stone, sand, and clay, and manufacture of structural metal products
the output index has surpassed its level of the second half of 1990 by 150 percent.
In the tradables sector, however, especially in the capital goods sector, things do not look so bright.
It is proving extremely difficult for eastern German firms to establish themselves in western German
and international markets, to develop the right product for a market niche, and to break into existing
relations between buyers and sellers. In addition, the economic prospects of the tradables sector have
been dimmed by the recession in western Germany. An export basis has not yet been established.
In the last quarter of 1993, the output index in manufacturing stood at 78 percent of the level in the
second half of 1990. In the capital goods industry, the output index only reached 64.2 percent of its
original level. In the electrical engineering industry, the output index was at 60.1 percent. The
mechanical engineering industry (37.0) and the optical industry (including precision engineering and
watches) (26.3) had even lower output levels. These data clearly indicate a deindustrialization of the
eastern German economy.
The deindustrialization of eastern Germany, having at its root the inefficiency and obsoleteness of
the capital stock inherited from the socialist planning system, was aggravated by two factors: by the
conversion rate of 1:1 between the ostmark and the D-mark, which represented an appreciation of the
ostmark of about 400 percent, and by wage policy (see below). Furthermore, transfers from western
Germany have superimposed a Dutch-disease phenomenon. Transfers to households have stimulated
demand for nontradables; the nontradables sector has attracted capital and qualified labor and has
driven up factor costs (wages) in the tradables sector.
The eastern German experience reminds us that a supply response needs time. In addition, a major
issue has been to what extent bottlenecks in eastern Germany have hindered investment and have
prevented the growth process from starting and gaining momentum. These bottlenecks have been the
uncertainty with respect to property rights, an administrative system that had (and still has) to be built
up, an insufficient infrastructure in communications and transportation, and — what is very important
— delays in administrative and political decisions, especially when different layers of government
have to interact. Over time, some of the factors limiting growth have become less important.
In the restitution of private property, such as houses and lots, 28 percent of the 2.7 million privati-
zation applications have been resolved (September 30, 1993). In 1993, property rights problems were
not an issue in the privatization of firms. But they are still relevant in the housing sector, and conse-
quently for the development of the inner cities.Table 2 — Net Production
a of the Producing Sector in Eastern Germany
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using the index of net production for the producing sector adjusted by working days, multiplied by weights according to
the index base (2nd half 1990=100). — including repair.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1993a, 1994b].II. The Historic Failure of Wage Policy
Wage policy has been a failure in eastern Germany. At the end of 1993, nominal wages in eastern
Germany were at 80 percent of the western German level. Construction-related sectors and some
sectors in eastern Berlin reached the western German wage level (although the working hours in these
sectors are longer and the vacations shorter). At the end of 1993, other sectors were in the 80 percent
range, not only banking (82-85 percent), insurance (83 percent), but also retail trade (82 percent),
government (80 percent), and even the sectors with tremendous economic difficulties, the metal and
electrical engineering industries and iron and steel, both at 80 percent. In the eastern German economy
unit labor costs reached 184 percent of the western German level in 1993, indicating that this region is
not competitive in terms of labor costs. Labor's share in national income — which was 72 percent in
western Germany — amounted to 106 percent in 1993 [Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994a].
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q Fourth quarter 1 989. -
 b For Instance, early retirement, hidden
reserve. —
 c Employees in job-preserving schemes and retraining
programs. -
 d Partly estimated.
Source: Updated version of Figure 2.4 in Siebert [1993a]-The wage increases in eastern Germany have had repercussions in a number of areas. They have
made investment less profitable. While they have not greatly affected capital-intensive investment
projects of western German or of international firms in eastern Germany, they have had a negative
impact on the birth of new and small firms, which are faced with uncertain revenues, since they have
not yet established themselves in the market. Furthermore, adjustment of the old state firms has been
made more difficult. The demand for labor in the adjustment phase has been reduced, thus leading to
higher unemployment and a greater need for government programs and transfers (Figure 2). More-
over, the wage level has influenced social security payments. Thus, wage policy in eastern Germany
has directly affected the amount of transfers and the fiscal policy stance in Germany. In the meantime,
many of the new smaller firms do not worry about the negotiated wages, which normally are legally
or de facto mandatory in Germany. Moreover, there are now some signs that the adjustment of eastern
German wages is being stretched over a longer horizon.
III. Re-creating the Capital Stock
A self-sustaining growth process has not yet begun. In 1993, aggregate domestic demand (in 1991
prices) in eastern Germany amounted to DM415.3 billion, in contrast to a GDP of DM212.5 billion.
There was a gap of DM203 billion between aggregate domestic demand and GDP (Table 3). This was
the trade deficit in 1993. Aggregate domestic demand was financed by government transfers that are
estimated at DM150 billion annually for some time to come; in addition there were private capital
inflows.
Table 3 — Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product
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aIn 1991 prices; including railroads, postal services, and telecommunications.
Source: SachverstSndigenrat [1993, Table 13], Statistisches Bundesamt [1994b].
Self-sustaining growth can only start if the obsolete capital stock is rebuilt from scratch. We know
very well from the economics of transition that the shift from a centralized socialist planning system
to a market economy presents a shock to the representative socialist firm, changing all its constraints,
including the price vector. This implies that the capital stock of the firm becomes obsolete to a
considerable degree. This also holds for the capital stock of the economy.
The capital requirements in eastern Germany are high. Assuming that eastern Germany will have
the same capital stock per capita as western Germany after the transformation process has ended, the
capital stock of the enterprise sector would be DM1,300 billion.
1 This is a back-of-the-envelope
calculation for accumulated investment which assumes that the existing capital stock is completely
obsolete. Using the infrastructure of western Germany as a frame of reference, infrastructure capital in
eastern Germany would amount to DM545 billion after adjustment. This figure includes public
buildings and equipment, roads, railroads, postal and communications infrastructure, and waterways.
Assuming that one-third of the capital stock is usable, and assuming a ten-year period of adjustment, a
rough calculation shows that private investment of DM90 billion and public investment of DM40
billion per year, i.e., DM130 billion per year, would be needed. This figure does not include neither
the housing sector nor environmental protection.
Investment will be the decisive variable for the growth process in eastern Germany. It increased
from DM87 billion in 1991 and DM108 billion in 1992 to DM125.7 billion in 1993 (all figures in
1991 prices) (Table 4). Private investment accounted for the larger part of total investment. In 1993,
investment amounted to 51 percent of GDP.
After real GDP collapsed by 14 and 33 percent in 1990 and 1991, respectively, it increased by 9.7
and 7.1 percent in 1992 and 1993; expectations for 1994 run at 8 percent. It is expected that invest-
ment in equipment will rise at the same rate as in 1993. In the long run, if capital accumulation
continues, eastern Germany may very well contribute one percentage point to the overall German
growth rate.
1 The total western German capital stock was DM12,687 billion in 1991, that of the enterprise sector
DM5201 billion.10
IV. When Will Eastern Germany Catch Up?
How long will the adjustment process last? It is difficult to say. In their empirical cross-country
analysis of catching-up-processes in industrial countries, Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991] found that it
takes 15 years to close a growth gap by one-fourth. According to the same study it takes 70 years in
order to close three-quarters of the growth gap.
In evaluating the adjustment process it is important to distinguish between different types of capital
stock. Capital in the nontradables sector will be installed very quickly. A large part of this capital
stock is already in place. However, in the tradables sector, this will take a much longer time. Part of
this investment, for instance, direct investment, has been and will be undertaken when profit opportu-
nities are expected; this type of investment will be associated with a negative cash flow initially — a
cash-sink hole — which can be incurred because of high expected profits in the future. Other
investments will have to be financed through retained earnings requiring that profits are made. This
type of investment will only come about over time. Financing investment through retained earnings is
especially relevant for the newly founded small firms that must be at the heart of a Schumpeterian
process of the growth of firms in eastern Germany. The bulk of infrastructure (roads, telecommuni-
cations) will be created quickly, but mega-projects, such as a new airport for Berlin, may only be
started at the end of this decade and would need another ten years to be completed. Also new
transportation axes need time. Interpreting the spatial structure as a stock variable, adjustment will
depend on such mega-projects. Finally, rebuilding the housing stock will take two or three decades.
Of course, very much depends on what level of adjustment is aimed at. Germans always want the
100-percent solution, but in fact, net national income per head varies considerably from region to
region in western Germany. Some Lander in western Germany reach 80 percent of the western
German average. So far, the catching-up that has taken place has not been negligible. GDP per capita
(in current prices) rose from 28.8 percent of the western German level in 1991 to 40.7 percent in 1993
(38.8 percent in 1992).
A simple formula tells us how much time is needed for eastern Germany to catch up. Consider a
situation where eastern Germany eventually reaches 80 percent of the western German level of GDP
per capita. This is not an unrealistic frame of reference, since in western Germany some regions are
characterized by a similar percentage.
The results of using this formula depend on the difference in the real growth rates between eastern
and western Germany. If the difference in growth rates between east and west were only 1 percent, it
would take 67.6 years to reach an adjustment of 80 percent. With a 2-percent differential, the catching11
up could require 33.8 years (22.5 years with a 3-percent differential). Table 5 illustrates the potential
paths of catching up under different growth differentials between eastern and western Germany.
2
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1994b]; own calculations.
2 Let Y and ^93 be the initial GNP in eastern and western Germany, let a be the level to be reached, let
fi = 0.239 indicate the size of the eastern German population relative to western Germany, and let r
w and
r^ denote the growth rates, then
aP = Y93
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Calculated using the western German GDP, corrected by population size (23.9 percent).13
Figure 3 illustrates the closing of the growth gap when alternative growth differences prevail
between eastern and western Germany. It has been assumed that western Germany will grow at a
potential rate of 2.5 percent. The eastern German growth potential has been estimated by correcting
the western German growth potential for the size of eastern German population. For the period 1990-
1993, actual GDP data have been used. If the difference in the growth rates were 5 percent, eastern
Germany would reach 80 percent of the western German level in GDP per capita in 2007; if the
difference were 10 percent, the catching-up would occur in the year 2000. Of course, such mechanistic
calculations should not be overestimated. It is realistic to expect that the time profile of investment
will not be stretched evenly over the years. There are some reasons that it may be bell-shaped with the
greatest momentum in the period 1994-1996 implying higher growth rates of GDP in these years.
Figure 3 also illustrates the J-curve effect in the transformation of a socialist economy which is a
reflection of the existing capital stock becoming obsolete.
V. Reunification: A Shock to Germany
German reunification can be interpreted as a massive structural change or as an economic shock to
Germany as a whole. The shock has created an excess supply of labor and an excess demand for
capital to rebuild eastern Germany, both in public infrastructure and in the enterprise sector. Such a
structural change requires a shift in relative factor prices, which implies that the relative position of
labor has become less favorable. It also implies a relocation of private capital from western to eastern
Germany in the transition period. And it mandates governmental transfers, e.g., for financing
investments in infrastructure. This affects the fiscal policy stance. Germany is still in the process of
finding a new policy mix between fiscal, monetary, and wage policy to deal with this shock.
In addition, it is fascinating to consider whether and to what extent the characteristics of the
German electorate have changed due to reunification, for example, whether eastern German voters, on
average, have political preferences leaning towards less free market approaches and to what extent
they will affect economic policy in united Germany [Hillman, 1994].
The need to finance annual public transfers amounting to 5 percent of GDP has changed the
structural characteristics of western Germany. The budget deficit in 1993 was 5.1 percent of GDP for
the government (including the federal level, the Lander and the municipalities), and it amounted to
7.1 percent of GDP if the Treuhand, the social security system, the railroads, and the postal system are
included. Government debt has doubled within five years, climbing from 41 percent to over 60
percent of GDP. The tax burden has been increased; and the government share in GDP has risen from
45 to 52 percent. Germany has become a little less of a market economy and a little more of a state
economy. The government's increased demand for resources has created a severe burden for the
private sector, indicating that the long-term environment for economic growth in western Germany
has become less favorable. The potential growth rate of western Germany has been reduced for the
interim period; it is now estimated at 2.5 percent instead of 3 percent for the last years. The recession
in 1993 (Figure 4) may have partly been caused by Germany's attempting to find a new policy mix.14
Figure 4 — Gross Domestic Product





































° At constant prices. - Forecast.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1994a].
This situation can only be improved if fiscal policymakers succeed in consolidating the budget
situation, in reducing the budget deficit relative to GDP, and in bringing down the tax burden over the
coming years.
Germany's fiscal federal system has the principal merit of allowing a decentralization of political
decision making and of giving room to regional preferences, but this same system makes a
reorientation of fiscal policy in western Germany rather difficult. The Lander and municipalities in
the west have larger expenditures than the federal government, but the burden of adjustment arising
from German reunification has been put on the federal government. The Lander and the municipalities
in the west have taken only a smaller share in expenditure cuts than the federal government. This is a
structural reason why, on the whole, fiscal policy has not reacted with sufficient expenditure cuts or
caps on expenditure increases. The federal government therefore had little choice but to resort to tax
increases.
VI. Investment Hammering in the Basement
The transition process of eastern Germany is determined by three elements: the initial conditions, the
long-run equilibrium and the path to it. In the long run, eastern Germany should reach a stage of
development not too different from regions in western Germany or western Europe. In the interim
period, the variables discussed such as privatization, restructuring of the firms, wage policy, built-up
of the private capital stock, and improvement in infrastructure will, of course, affect the path to the15
equilibrium. A very important issue is to what extent the path will influence the characteristics of the
long-run solution.
If policymakers in Germany do not make serious mistakes, one can be optimistic and hope that the
long-run effects will dominate and that catching-up will be successful. In this context, one is remined
of the Hicksian theory of the lower turning point in the business cycle. According to Hicks, a turning
point will come about from "autonomous investment hammering in the basement." Capital accumula-
tion in eastern Germany should play a similar role. It should be hammering in the basement...16
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